INTRODUCTION
In producing or reinforcing 'relations of dependency and power' through immigration controls, 1 States may disadvantage migrant women in enjoying human rights and engender conditions ripe for human rights abuses. Think of immigration norms that make domestic workers -who in practice are often women -dependent on their example, sex, race, migration status).
9
It is therefore 'structural intersectionality' 10 that informs the arguments in this article.
The article demonstrates that the notion of intersecting borders of inequality has the ability to put disadvantaging structures front and centre in the analysis of migrant women's human rights claims. The notion does not only illuminate the State's role in creating, reproducing and reinforcing these structures. It additionally opens up a wider set of responses to tackle the State's contributory role to disadvantage. To illustrate how intersecting borders of inequality may work in practice, the article uses cases of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court) as examples.
'INTERSECTING BORDERS OF INEQUALITY'
This part introduces the notion of 'intersecting borders of inequality' as a lens to see and challenge the disadvantages underlying the violations of migrant women's human rights. The notion does not take identity categories such as sex, race, and migration status as the starting point in the human rights analysis. Rather, it turns the disadvantaging structures themselves into points of departure. 11 For example, the focus is not sex but sexism, not migration status but immigration norms. Through the lens of intersecting borders, the analytical gaze thus starts moving outwards-inwards: 10 ibid. 11 ibid 796. I follow renewed intersectionality efforts seeking to 'foreground the social dynamics and relations that constitute subjects, displacing the emphasis on the subjects and categories themselves as the starting point of inquiry '. be 'wrong' with the group or individual. 12 The approach thus facilitates scrutinising something feminists like Martha Fineman advocate for interrogating: the role of the State in (re)producing vulnerability and disadvantage. 13 It additionally escapes falling into stigmatising views of vulnerability and disadvantage. 14 In making structures the starting point of the inquiry, the proposed lens shows how vulnerability and disadvantage are societally shaped and not natural attributes of certain individuals or fixed identity dimensions of certain groups. As migration scholars put it, 'migrants are not naturally vulnerable; rather the state is deeply implicated in constructing vulnerability through immigration controls and practices'.
15
To see these disadvantaging structures, the notion of borders is analytically useful because it suggests something that lies outside the individual or group and thereby directs the gaze outwards. Moreover, borders evoke in their most basic sense lines and divisions through which '[h]ierarchies of belonging and of exclusion' 16 may be created, reproduced or reinforced. Borders are not here understood as territorially fixed lines. 17 They are understood as shifting and as following and surrounding people inside State territory. 18 The language of borders, moreover, has a strong symbolic appeal in the sphere of migration. After all, border control seems to be the core business of immigration norms and practice. whose sexuality deviates from these normative expectations are more likely to be denied the rights and benefits linked to citizenship.
29
The next parts illustrate the ways in which intersecting borders facilitates recognising the inequalities underlying the human rights violations migrant women complain of. ECtHR cases are used for illustrative purposes. In nearly all these cases, the ECtHR finds in the applicants' favour. In some of these cases, it acknowledges some structural barriers (especially formal borders). Despite recognising some of the barriers underlying the violations, the recognition is rather ad hoc and tends to miss the practical and normative borders as well as the intersections between them.
This article does not, however, aim to make generalisable descriptive claims or to critique the Court's approach in its case law concerning migrant women. Nor does it intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of this area of the ECtHR's case law.
The aim, rather, is to use these cases to illustrate the normative benefits of applying an intersecting borders frame in human rights analysis. Inattention to the role of intersecting borders may lead to blaming the migrant woman entirely for the disadvantage she experiences while deflecting the blame from the State. Haydarie and Others v. the Netherlands illustrates how this blindness serves to construe the applicant's disadvantage as her choice. 30 The case involved an Afghan woman legally residing in the Netherlands with one of her children and with her disabled sister. 31 The Dutch authorities rejected her request to reunite with three of her other children because she lacked the independent income required by immigration rules to support her children (she relied on welfare benefits). 32 The domestic authorities would have not maintained the income requirement in her case had she made 'serious efforts' to secure a job during a period of three years since she became entitled to work.
33
At Strasbourg, one of the applicant's claims was that, in assessing her situation, the Dutch authorities had failed to give weight to her 'unpaid care labour' for her sister. 34 In declaring her Article 8 ECHR claim inadmissible, the ECtHR notes that the applicant had not applied for any jobs and instead 'preferred to care for her wheel-chair bound sister at home'. 35 The Court adds that she could have entrusted 'the care of her sister to an agency'.
36
In assessing whether the applicant had made 'serious efforts' to find a job, both the domestic authorities and the ECtHR reproduce a normative border and ignore a practical one. They reproduce the normative border that assumes that unpaid care work is inactive and unproductive. As feminist scholarship has shown, these borders are gendered given that caretaking continues to be largely performed by women. The other border operating to condition Haydarie's efforts to find a job is the practical border of language. The State tacitly reinforces this practical border by ignoring its disadvantageous impact on an individual's job search efforts. The active attitude that the State expected from the applicant assumes that she already speaks the language. The 'serious efforts' required from her included actively looking for work, registering at employment agencies, responding to vacancy openings, writing job applications, and carrying out 'labour-market oriented studies'. 43 The State further reinforces the practical border by ignoring the applicant's language efforts in order 'to improve her chances on the labour market'. 44 On the need to abandon the 'statist migration control assumption' according to which 'excluding aliens needs no justification' see Costello (n 23) 24 and 317. She states: 'Even if we treat the control of immigration and some aspects of asylum as subject to a degree of discretionary power, this does not mean we should not scrutinize the impact of the exercise of those powers on human rights, just as other exercises of public power are scrutinized'. 
72
The formal border in Soares de Melo intersects with two normative ones:
coupled motherhood and nuclear family. These borders construe the applicant's forms of family and mothering as 'deviant' and therefore as the 'wrong' types of arrangements to raise children. According to the Lisbon Court of Appeal, the fact that the applicant was separated from the children's father was 'enough to show moral negligence'. 73 The applicant is here negatively judged because she no longer had a relationship with the children's father. The Supreme Court further holds her singleparent household to the 'norm' of the heterosexual nuclear family: '[t]here is a particularly dangerous situation when the biological family is unstructured, the father is absent from the daily life of the children and the mother shows great emotional and professional instability'. 74 The statement suggests that, without a father, the family is unstructured and that, without his support, the mother is unstable. 82 The expert concluded that the applicant's parental inability was due to a health condition developed during her child's delivery and to her lack of time to care for him.
83
In finding a violation of her right to family life, the Court condemned the Framed in these terms, the applicant's parental inability is narrowly understood as arising exclusively from personal difficulties and the demands on the State as demands to 'fix' an individual inability.
Looking at Zhou through the lens of intersecting borders allows seeing that the applicant's care inability was more broadly shaped by structural factors to which the State had contributed. The factors include practical borders inherent in the lack of family to count on for childcare and, as stated above, normative expectations about women's role in the family. The two borders interact to construe the applicant as incapable of exercising her parental role and therefore as unfit to raise her child.
There are several indications in the case that Zhou had no one to leave the child with.
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In assessing the applicant's situation, the domestic authorities ignored the impact of the lack of social or family support on her childcare capacity. In so doing, and like in Haydarie and Moser, the authorities reinforced the disadvantage created by these borders for the individual. As noted before, a complete and objective evaluation of the individual circumstances should consider the negative implications of this practical border. In addition, and as argued in Moser, States may be asked another procedural obligation: to evaluate all available support measures before radically breaking up the family.
While the practical border is ignored in the domestic assessment of Zhou's situation, the normative border is enforced. The expert conclusions, on which the Italian courts relied to place the child for adoption, signal gendered expectations about women's place and role in society. Zhou, according to the expert, was not capable of caring for her child in part because she 'had no time to look after the child because of her work' ('elle n'avait pas le temps de s'occuper de l'enfant ̀ cause de son 86 ibid 57. 87 ibid 59. 88 ibid. 89 ibid 5, 7 and 8. She was no longer together with her partner. She claimed that her highly variable work schedule did not allow her to take care of her son 'toute seule'. Social services had made several (failed) attempts to find day-care placement for the child. When the host family arranged by social services announced that they would no longer take care of the child, Zhou asked a couple in the neighbourhood to care for him.
travail').
90 Informing this conclusion is the gendered division of labour that expects women to stay home and undertake the primary role of childcare. Zhou is thus punished (her child is taken away from her) for transgressing normative motherhood: she is a 'bad' mother for placing work above childcare. Feminist critiques of child custody decisions in other jurisdictions have shown how 'the ideal mother stereotype continues to play a role in favouring the "home-sphere" mother, which forces a woman to either adhere to the stereotype or risk losing her child'.
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Both in Zhou and in Soares de Melo, the normative borders enforced by the domestic decisions implicitly consist of gender stereotypes that express and reinforce women's inferiority in relation to men. Women are respectively considered as belonging in the home-sphere and as morally suspect without a male partner.
Moreover, the stereotypes informing the domestic assessments of the applicants' parental role are not innocuous. They serve to cast the applicants' relationship with their children as deficient and to justify the drastic removal of their children.
International human rights law has already recognised that subordinating stereotypes cannot justify interference with human rights. 92 Allowing States to rely on these stereotypes would imply accepting that discrimination is a legitimate objective for
States to pursue. 93 Evidence of harmful stereotypes in domestic assessments of parental capacity may lead to additional violations of non-discrimination. States may not only be required to refrain from harmfully stereotyping in the individual case.
They may be additionally demanded positive obligations to eradicate stereotypes in domestic decision-making. 94 The latter type of demand, especially, holds a transformative potential because it requires working towards dismantling discriminatory normative borders.
95
Normative borders, however, may not always consist of stereotypes that 
BEYOND THE EVIL EMPLOYER
The first case, Siliadin v. France, 96 offers an opportunity to reflect on how formal and practical borders may engender exploitation conditions and on how normative borders may negate State protection against exploitation. Siwa-Akofa Siliadin, a Togolese woman, arrived in France with a tourist visa when she was fifteen years old to work at a couple's home until her plane ticket had been repaid and her migration status regularised. 97 In reality, however, she became an unpaid domestic worker. 98 The couple 'lent' her to another couple, for whom she carried out home care and childcare tasks for several years without payment, without identity documents, without a day off, and in poor living conditions. The Court ruled that the French law had not offered her effective protection due to the lack of provisions specifically criminalising forced labour and servitude, 100 both of them prohibited by Article 4 ECHR. The Court looked at the applicant's age and migration status to assess whether her situation amounted to forced labour. In establishing whether she worked under 'the menace of penalty' -one of the features characterising forced labour in international labour law 101 -the Court concluded that her situation was equivalent:
She was an adolescent girl in a foreign land, unlawfully present on French territory and in fear of arrest by the police … Mr and Mrs B. nurtured that fear and led her to believe that her status would be regularised.
102
The Court's references to the applicant's unlawful presence, fear of arrest and promise of regularisation of her status signal the operation of formal borders. Though in the judgment there is hardly any information on the French immigration rules, let us assume for the sake of the argument that the French State restricted legal migration routes for domestic workers thereby producing a high level of irregularity in the sector. 103 Human rights scholars have discussed the links between immigration norms, irregularity in the domestic work sector, abusive employment conditions, deportability, and limited access to State protection. 104 The deportability associated with 'illegality' 105 acts as 'a formidable obstacle' to demanding protection against abuses 106 and further reinforces migrants' vulnerability to abuse. 107 As a migration scholar notes, '[p]recarious work for those working illegally is not simply at the whim of individual employers, but structurally produced by the interaction of employment and immigration legislation'. 108 Attention to the role of immigration norms has enabled some human rights scholars to suggest State obligations capable of addressing the disadvantaging effects of these norms. Stoyanova, for example,
proposes that States adopt a regulatory framework that enables migrants to report abuses to the authorities without risking deportation.
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The Court's reasoning in Siliadin further signals the operation of a practical border: minimal social networks to count on for support. 110 In determining whether the applicant's services amounted to servitude, the Court says:
As a minor, she had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated, and had no means of living elsewhere than in the home of Mr and Mrs B. … She was entirely at Mr and Mrs B.'s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred.
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Isolation and no means of living elsewhere are among the circumstances that, in the Court's view, prevented the applicant from changing her situation and therefore turned her services into servitude. 112 Family and friends might have enabled the applicant to break the isolation and dependency underpinning her servitude. As seen earlier, though States do not create this kind of practical border, they may reinforce it by ignoring its negative impact on the women concerned. Again, acknowledging this reinforcing role is important because it allows thinking about possible mitigating responses. These responses may include procedural ones such as taking into account the role of this practical border in reinforcing domestic workers' dependence when designing responses to labour exploitation. 108 Anderson (n 21) 311. The 'figure of the abusive employer', she adds, 'throws a shadow over the role of the state in constructing vulnerability'. 109 Stoyanova (n 4) 387. 110 Siliadin v France (n 96) 22. One of the French courts actually pinpointed this border when it noted that Siliadin had 'no friends and almost no family to help her'. 111 ibid 126. Emphasis added. 112 ibid 128-9.
A third border operating in Siliadin is 'the normative assumption that women's primary work is in the home'.
113 Lurking behind the low value given to domestic work in many societies 114 are perceptions that this work flows 'naturally from women's genetic endowments rather than knowledge and skills acquired through education'. 115 From the information available in the Siliadin judgment, it is hard to tell whether domestic work enjoyed such a low societal value and legal protection in France. Yet the reasoning of one of the domestic courts reveals that these gendered views of domestic work played out in the particular case. The 145 See Mullally (n 4) 151 (noting that the 'next step of opening up safer migration status is not one that is usually taken, however, reflecting a wider reluctance on the part of States to recognize the links between access to safe migration routes, application of human rights norms to immigration law and policy, and the potential to reduce migrant women's vulnerability to trafficking'.).
Rantsev this could mean amending the artiste visa scheme so as to unwind artistes'
dependency on their employers. Dismantling borders of inequality may not always be possible. States do not necessarily create practical borders such as those arising from insufficient family or social networks. Normative borders, in turn, are deeply ingrained and normalised in society. They are therefore difficult to recognise, let alone change. At times, normative borders operate discreetly, even silently, and certainly diffusively across the kind of domestic decisions that tend to escape attention: those of administrative bodies and lower courts. Even those normative borders that may be easier to spot given the use of discriminatory language (for example, the coupled motherhood border used to question Soares de Melo's morality) cannot be dismantled overnight.
Demolishing these borders requires deep changes in dominant cultural attitudes.
Transforming formal borders comes with a different set of challenges, as immigration control is considered 'a central substantive aspect of sovereignty'. 
